"Discuss feminist criticisms of liberalism. Are they successful?"



There are many strands of feminism – Marxist feminist, Liberal feminism (regularly attacked by other feminists for "seeking equality in masculinist institutions on men's terms."1 ), and Libertarian feminism, to name only a few – combining to make it possibly the most diverse political philosophical theory in existence today. There is remarkably little in common between the various groups, other than one crucial belief which binds them together – the desire to put an end to the systematic subjugation of women at the hands of men.

In an attempt to find an ideology more acceptable to them than those currently influential in society, feminists have mounted an attack on liberalism, branding it sexist and chauvinistic. In this essay I intend to examine this attack, comment on its effectiveness, and assess whether feminism really offers an alternative to liberalism.

Looking first to the history of liberalism, where the feminist grounds her argument in the historical chauvinism of Locke, Mill, and Kant, there is a discrepancy between liberal beliefs and those of early liberals. It is, however, worth taking into consideration the fact that these men, although sexist by today's standards, were remarkably egalitarian for their own time. Mill was, for example, one of the earliest philosophers to assert that marriage should be treated as a contract between equals. This lesser sexism, although still present, was a result of their adherence to liberalism, which stresses liberty for all and attacks subordination of anybody.

Even John Rawls writing in the 1970s, a rather more enlightened time than that of his predecessors, made at least one oversight which can be seen as potentially, if not overtly, sexist. He failed to cover intra-family issues in his theory of justice. Rawls accepted the traditional belief that the family is a natural biologically defined unit, with a man at the head of the household. His theory of justice covered the distribution of resources between families but not within them, leaving men (as the assumed head of the family) to distribute wealth among their dependants as they saw fit. This enabled the perpetuation of the dependency of married women on their husbands for money and security.

Although there is considerably more gender equality within the job market now than ever before, it is still easy for a man to control his wife financially as women are still pushed into lower earning, part-time jobs. The structure of the family is largely responsible for this dichotomy between the male and female employment patterns, as it is expected of women to be responsible for housework, child rearing etc. Even the minority of men who do take on the domestic chores of the household to enable their wife to go to work, either because she can secure a higher paid job or because the man simply prefers to do that kind of work, is often mocked by his peers for engaging in what is still pejoratively called 'women's work'.

It is not unusual for women, even when they are engaged in full time employment, to come home from work and do the famous 'double day' in order to do domestic chores in addition to their paid work. Studies also show that women with full time jobs usually do more housework than their unemployed male partners. This is an example of the false equality offered to women. They are given the chance to compete with men for previously male dominated occupations, but are expected to maintain their assumed family obligations simultaneously.

These problems within families are not a fatal flaw for liberalism, however. It is more a matter of omission that leads to this criticism of Rawls, as there is nothing in his philosophy to say that it cannot be extended to apply also within families. It is also very important to note that the criticisms of Kant, Mill and Locke for sexism are attacks on Liberals, not attacks on Liberalism. One cannot attack a theory for its adherents. The misogynistic actions of certain liberals are not a reason to claim that liberalism itself is inherently structured against women.

Catherine MacKinnon argues that liberalism is a patriarchal system,2 which has failed to redress the age-old imbalance between male and female status. While admitting it has gone some way towards promoting equality, it has tackled the matter in the wrong way.

In cases of discrimination based on gender, especially in the workplace, the cry usually taken up is that women should be able to compete equally with men for jobs, but the real problem in need of redressing is that the entire system is structured to ensure that women can't compete on equal footing. There is systematic discrimination at work even in the way working hours; height and weight restrictions etc. are devised. If the case of the British army is taken as an example, and disregarding the fact that women are still not allowed to serve on the front line, there are no regulations forbidding women from serving in the army, but the height and weight restrictions put in place to ensure that all who serve are able to handle the heavy equipment required are themselves biased towards men, who are generally stronger and taller than women.

The 'difference approach' to feminism states that discrimination on the grounds of relevant difference is not a problem, but that "sex differences (real or imagined) must never be used as a source of, or justification for, inequality and male domination."3

Arguments levelled at feminists in response to this claim include the necessity for military entrance restrictions, but this can be countered with the example of the Japanese army. Japanese men are on average smaller and lighter than Western men, and so their military equipment was initially designed to be manageable by smaller men. This did not reduce their fighting effectiveness at all, as I'm sure anybody who fought in WW II would agree, and thereby demonstrates that it is entirely unnecessary for equipment to be as large and unwieldy as it is. The only reason for it to be the size and weight it is can be explained by the fact that it was always naturally assumed that it would only be used by men.

This form of non-discriminatory sexism is perpetuated by liberal views in society in many forms other than the military. The way that the working day in most of the higher paid, higher responsibility jobs is structured is designed with the male timetable in mind, assuming that men will not be burdened with childcare responsibilities. Women with young children are automatically discouraged, if not discounted, from applying to jobs that require the kind of time commitment expected of working men. These hours are not implemented because it is actually necessary for a worker to be in the office continually between the hours of 9am and 5pm, or 6pm etc. these are just the traditional working hours because men established the pattern for the working day, and modelled it on a schedule that suited them.

Allowing women to compete on an equal footing with men for jobs is a wonderful step towards equality for women, but one of the main problems that feminist have with liberalism is that it appears to consider this the only step necessary. If women are able to apply for the same jobs as men, and be considered purely on their merit rather than their gender, then the job market is considered an equal and fair one. It is often ignored that the system is gender-biased before women even begin to apply. Merely granting women the right to compete equally in a system defined, maintained and run by men is not granting them equality at all. It is a mockery of equality, as women fight for equal status and yet continued to be devalued by a system they have no hope of breaking into.

To quote Will Kymlicka, "many feminists believe that the principles which were developed with men's experience and interests in mind are incapable of adequately recognizing women's needs, or incorporating women's experiences." 4

As an attack on liberalism itself, however, the problem of existing discrimination is ineffectual. The discrimination approach has been the traditional liberal response to feminist complaints, but there is nothing in the ethical theory of liberalism that prevents it, or even discourages it, from adopting the stronger stance, often called the dominance approach, of reordering society to allow women to redefine the traditional male roles, or to create female/genuinely gender-neutral roles themselves.

Liberalism stresses the importance of liberty, equality and respect for all. Despite current conventions being more male-centric than feminist would like, a proper application of Rawls' Original Position, for example, would prevent male domination.

The 'ethic of care' is another example of the way in which women are marginalized in society today, despite the potential truth and useful application of their theories. Feminists, including Mary Wollstonecraft, Carol Gilligan, and Joan Tronto, argue that the organisation of society in the traditional male-female dichotomy perpetuated by the liberal rules of law and justice prevent the application of the female care ethic. This involves the idea that men and women think in fundamentally different ways about moral matters – men thinking about what principles are required to be moral, and women thinking about the disposition required to be moral – in short, women learn to be moral intuitively, men learn how to be moral through a process of rule application.

However, this is again merely a pseudo-attack on liberalism, focussed more on the adherents than the theory itself. Liberalism does not itself discount the idea of applying the female-based moral intuition learned within the caring environment of domesticity and family raising to the larger institution of justice.

The public/private dichotomy is the last major area in which feminists criticise liberalism. The socially defined family is seen as part of the private sphere, and beyond the realm of most applications of justice. Whereas certain issues, such as the rising rape and domestic/sexual abuse statistics, are seen as a matter for public justice, most areas of family life are still considered as private matters and left free for discrimination to continue unchecked. The argument of 'separate spheres' discussed by Janet Radcliffe Richards in her essay, "Separate Spheres"5 suggests that women and men occupy fundamentally different areas of life, with men in the public sphere and women in the private/domestic sphere. This is actually against the liberal theory of equality of opportunity, however, and cannot be used to attack liberalism.

The main problem feminists have with liberalism is actually, it appears, more to do with the current applications of the doctrines than the doctrines themselves. Liberalism stresses the importance of freedom, opportunity, and respect – all conditions which feminism needs in order to reach its goal of a state that treats people equally regardless of gender. Feminists present some very compelling arguments as to why women are treated in an unfair and subordinate way in relation to men in society, but their attack on liberalism is unfounded. In as much as the feminist complaints are justified, a liberal would agree with them and support them. The feminist problem is with the way that society is currently structured, but if liberals and feminists were to work together, the restructuring they could accomplish under liberal doctrines would be exactly the change that feminists have been fighting for, and so feminism is not an alternative to liberalism, and does not attack it successfully, despite the valid points it makes.

Footnotes:

1. The Globalisation of World Politics, John Baylis and Steve Smith, 2001
2. Feminism Unmodified, Catherine MacKinnon, 1987
3. Contemporary Political Philosophy, Will Kymlicka, 2001, p383
4. Contemporary Political Philosophy, Will Kymlicka, 2001, p377
5. Applied Ethics, ed. Peter Singer, 1986




Bibliography:

John Baylis and Steve Smith; The Globalisation of World Politics; 2001; Oxford University Press; New York.

Catherine MacKinnon; Feminism Unmodified; 1987; Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.

Will Kymlicka; Contemporary Political Philosophy; 2001; Oxford University Press; New York

Peter Singer, ed.; Applied Ethics; 1986; Oxford University Press; New York